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FRAYING AT THE EDGES – UK SURROGACY LAW IN 2015 
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(A Child: Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act: parental order) [2015] EWFC 73; A & B (Children) 
(Surrogacy: Parental orders: time limits) [2015] EWHC 911 (Fam). 
Summary 
This commentary examines a series of high profile surrogacy cases decided in 2015. Taken singly or 
together, these cases serve to illustrate how the UK’s law on surrogacy – in particular its provisions 
regarding eligibility for parental orders – are not only out of date, but also becoming nonsensical. 
These problems culminate in an evident inability of the law to protect the best interests of children 
born through surrogacy, and indicate strongly a need for reform. 
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INTRODUCTION 
2015 saw a raft of cases about surrogacy arrangements that prove – if we didn’t already know – that 
the law regulating surrogacy in the UK is increasingly out of date and failing to adequately protect 
the best interests of children and families. In part, this is because the law’s provisions have the 
unintended (and unconsidered) effect of driving some prospective parents into overseas 
arrangements, lured by supposed certainty of outcome and often potentially by what they believe to 
be more favourable legal parenthood provisions (for example having both intended parents (IPs) 
named on the birth certificate). Overseas surrogacy arrangements are almost all commercial, often 
brokered by profit-making agencies or organisations. Costs vary by destination but, for example, it is 
common for the total costs of surrogacy undertaken in the US to be upwards of £100,000.1 Other 
destinations are cheaper, which might explain their sudden booms, yet they raise further and 
different ethical questions, particularly regarding the potential exploitation of women.2 Many 
countries (such as India, Thailand, Nepal and Mexico) have, since their surrogacy market burgeoned, 
closed down or are in the process of closing their doors to foreigners in the wake of ethical and/or 
practical problems. That said, while one door closes another tends to open, so ethical issues merely 
shift geographically. 
The bulk of the UK’s surrogacy law stems from the Surrogacy Arrangements Act 1985 (now over 
three decades old – science and society have seen great change in that time) and the Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology (HFE) Act 1990 (as amended in 2008). The law prohibits commercial 
                                                          
1 Costs include travel, accommodation, broker/agent fees, clinical costs (for IVF), the surrogate’s fee, 
health/life insurance for the surrogate and for the baby/ies once born, etc. See e.g. ‘Childless UK couples 
forced abroad to find surrogates’ The Observer (21 February 2016), which states ‘[i]t costs around $130,000 
(about £91,000) plus insurance to secure the services of a surrogate in the US’. 
2 The alternative argument – certainly advanced by some journalistic articles and television documentaries on 
surrogacy in e.g. India – is that surrogacy is not exploitation but in fact a life-changing moment for many (poor) 
women – the one-off payment enabling them to buy a house for their family, or send their children to a good 
school, for example (see e.g. ‘House of Surrogates’ (BBC4, October 2013)). 
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arrangement of surrogacy, renders surrogacy arrangements unenforceable by/against either party, 
determines legal parenthood following a successful arrangement and introduces ‘parental order’ 
(PO) provisions, under which eligible IPs may apply to have legal parenthood transferred to them 
after having a child via surrogacy. Recent judgments indicate increasing judicial dissatisfaction with 
some provisions of the law, especially in relation to the criteria under which PO applications may be 
granted and how these match the realities of modern day surrogacy. Judges seem increasingly 
prepared to purposively interpret or ‘read down’ the provisions of S54 HFE Act 2008 to give better 
effect to the welfare of the child, as they rightly should. Notwithstanding this judicial flexibility, it 
appears possible that at least one of the PO eligibility requirements under S54 might in fact violate 
IPs’ or children’s human rights.3 
This paper examines a number of 2015 surrogacy cases which indicate separately and together a 
pressing need for reform of surrogacy laws in the UK. First, in H v S (Surrogacy Agreement),4 the care 
of a 15-month old girl was awarded to a male same-sex couple, against the legal mother’s wishes. 
She had deceived the father(s) about the extent to which she wished to be involved in the girl’s life – 
that is, whether she was acting as a surrogate or not. Second, two cases involving single men’s use of 
surrogacy also highlighted the law’s inadequacies – the first was Re B v C (Surrogacy: Adoption),5 
where a man had no choice but to adopt his own biological child, who was also his legal brother. 
Later, in Re Z (A Child: Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act: parental order)6 the President of the 
Family Division found that a single father was unable to apply for a PO merely by virtue of his single 
status. This raised human rights questions that were incapable of resolution at the time, but the case 
is continuing on a human rights basis with a decision expected later in 2016. This is particularly 
interesting because if the rights-based argument succeeds, the law will presumably require 
amending to make it rights compatible. In A & B (Children) (Surrogacy: Parental orders: time limits),7 
the provision requiring a PO application to be made within six months of the child’s birth was 
circumvented in order to allow an order to be granted in respect of children aged five and eight 
years old. It appears from this decision – and similar others – that, in reality, where it is in the 
child(ren)’s best interests, there is now no real time limit in the law within which a PO application 
must be made, making somewhat a mockery of the provision. 
 
PROBLEMS WITH THE EXISTING PARENTAL ORDER ELIGIBILITY CRITERIA ALREADY EXISTED 
A PO is a court order, granted under the provisions of S54 HFE Act 2008, which transfers legal 
parenthood from the surrogate (and often her spouse or partner) to the IPs.8 Without a PO the IPs 
                                                          
3 It was argued in Re Z (A Child : Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act : parental order) [2015] EWFC 73 that  
the court should not fail to accurately recognise parenthood in situations in which people (in this case a single 
man) used surrogacy to conceive biological children on their own and that the court should take responsibility 
for evolving the law using its powers under the Human Rights Act 1998. See further discussion of this case, 
below. 
4 [2015] EWFC 36. 
5 [2015] EWFC 17. 
6 [2015] EWFC 73. 
7 [2015] EWHC 911 (Fam). 
8 The plural is used here as Re Z tells us that the letter of the law here is (currently) clear – only couples may 
apply for a PO as S54 HFE Act 2008 explicitly makes reference to applications being made by ‘two people’ (at 
[5]).  
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do not become the legal parents of the child(ren) and the surrogate remains the legal mother. This 
obviously has consequences, including the possibility that the people raising the child(ren) do not 
gain the legal authority to make certain decisions about their life, education or medical care 
(although they can gain parental responsibility), and the surrogate (and perhaps her partner/spouse) 
has to be located to give authority in such matters. There may be longer-term consequences too, for 
example regarding inheritance and succession rights. Though the cases mentioned above clearly 
illustrate that the PO requirements need reconsideration, they were not the first to demonstrate 
problems with the existing criteria; prior to 2015 cracks were already showing in the ‘eligibility 
requirements’ required under S54. Largely, this was due to retrospective authorisations by the court 
of payments made to surrogates that would otherwise seem to contravene the provisions. The 
Surrogacy Arrangements Act 1985 makes clear that no surrogacy arrangement can be enforced by or 
against any of the parties who made the agreement.9 The Act also criminalises the initiation and 
negotiation of surrogacy arrangements (by third parties) on a commercial basis, as well as the 
compiling of information for use in such. However, it is not an offence for money to change hands 
between a surrogate and IPs.10 The ‘sanction’ for anyone doing so – that is, paying or being paid for a 
surrogacy arrangement – is supposedly contained in S54, in that the payer may render themselves 
ineligible for a PO. There is a risk that any payment (or other benefit) considered to be more than 
(undefined) ‘expenses reasonably incurred’ by the surrogate could lead to the court’s refusal to 
grant an order (subject to the other criteria being met).11 
As part of IPs’ eligibility for a PO, S54(8) demands that the court is: 
…satisfied that no money or other benefit (other than for expenses reasonably incurred) has 
been given or received by either of the applicants for or in consideration of— 
(a) the making of the order, 
(b) any agreement required by subsection (6),12 
(c) the handing over of the child to the applicants, or 
(d) the making of arrangements with a view to the making of the order,  
unless authorised by the court. 
                                                          
9 S1(A), as inserted by S36 HFE Act 1990. 
10 This stems from a recommendation of the Warnock Committee, which wished children to be free from the 
perceived ‘taint of criminality’ (at para. 8.19). 
11 The closest thing we have to a definition of ‘reasonable expenses’ is found in the 1998 Brazier Report, which 
had identified some surrogates receiving payment ‘in excess of any reasonable level of actual expenses 
incurred’ (‘Surrogacy: Review for Health Ministers if Current Arrangements for Payments and Regulation, 
Report of the Review Team’ Cm 4068 (London: HMSO, 1998), para. 3.20). The Report recommended that 
surrogates should only be able to receive compensation for ‘genuine and verifiable’ expenses (para 5.25) 
associated with the pregnancy (and gave a list of examples of the kinds of thing this might include) but none of 
the Report’s recommendations ever became law. 
12 S54(6) requires full and unconditional consent to the making of the order by the surrogate (the legal mother 
of the child(ren) by virtue of S33 HFE Act 2008) and her spouse or partner (who may be the legal father or 
second parent subject to the provisions in the HFE Act in ss35-36 and ss42-43, respectively). 
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The irony is that when an arrangement runs smoothly (as the vast majority do) and the handing of 
the child to the IPs by the surrogate is not disputed (as it rarely is), the provision suggests that a 
court should consider refusing a PO, even though the child by this time is well and truly in the care of 
the IPs and may have been for some months. The surrogate doesn’t want the child back, the IPs 
intend to continue raising the child, yet the law says that legal parenthood might not be able to rest 
with them, because of a payment. This lack of certainty must surely be part of what drives some IPs 
to seek out overseas surrogates. The alternative path for IPs in such a situation would be to apply to 
adopt – further disrupting the family.13 How could such a situation possibly be in the best interests 
of a child? 
The final words of S54(8) allow a court to authorise any payments made to surrogates.14 This is not 
as uncommon as might be expected, given the tone of the law: payments have been retrospectively 
authorised in cases going back decades.15 Commenting on this, the Brazier Report said the 
committee was ‘not aware of any case in which an application has been refused on the grounds that 
an unacceptably large sum of money has been paid to the surrogate mother by the commissioning 
couple’.16 
The increase in cross-border commercial surrogacy arrangements in more recent years led to a 
series of new ‘payment’ cases being brought before the courts. It became relatively common to see 
the court retrospectively authorising such payments, in the best interests of the children concerned. 
In Re X & Y (Foreign Surrogacy),17 Hedley J authorised payments of 235 Euros per month paid by a 
British couple to a Ukrainian surrogate, as well as a 25,000 Euro lump sum when the children (twins) 
were born. These payments evidently exceeded the surrogate’s ‘expenses’ (in fact, the lump sum 
was to enable her to place a deposit on a flat). Granting the order, Hedley J commented: 
it is almost impossible to imagine a set of circumstances in which by the time the case comes 
to court, the welfare of the child (particularly a foreign child) would not be gravely 
compromised (at the very least) by a refusal to make an order.18 
                                                          
13 That said, adoption is incredibly complex as a solution for international surrogacy due to the restrictions on 
bringing a child into the UK for the purposes of adoption, and the criminalisation of payments. As Russell J 
acknowledged in in A & B (Children) (Surrogacy: Parental orders: time limits) [2015], adoption in such 
circumstances would be ‘a square peg for a round hole’, adding that the ‘very existence of parental orders is a 
testament to the decision of Parliament that adoption orders do not befit children born through surrogacy’ 
([67]-[68]). 
14 And in fact to agencies, brokers etc. Though it does not specifically say so, presumably the intention behind 
the law was only to allow retrospective authorisations – as prospective authorisations would indicate a more 
progressive approach to surrogacy than is reflected in the law more generally and suggest that the 
encumbrance of the post-birth parental order process is largely unnecessary. 
15 See, for early examples Re an Adoption Application (Surrogacy) [1987] 2 All ER 826; Re MW (Adoption: 
Surrogacy) [1995] 2 FLR 759; Re Q (A Minor) (Parental Order) [1996] 1 FLR 369; Re C [2002] EWHC 157 (Fam); 
[2002] 1 FLR 909. A different question is whether pre-birth authorisation of any money to change hands, for 
expenses or otherwise (what is an ‘expense’? Is time? Is discomfort?) might serve the interests of the child 
better, rather than post-birth assessments being made adding to the instability and precariousness of the 
child’s legal situation. 
16 At para 5.3. 
17 [2008] EWHC 3030. 
18 At [24]. 
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In Re L (a minor),19 Hedley J authorised payments made to a surrogate from Illinois, US, citing the 
Human Fertilisation and Embryology (Parental Orders) Regulations 2010 which had shortly before 
made the child’s welfare the court’s ‘paramount’ rather than just its ‘first’  consideration. The 
approach was followed in X and Y (Children),20 regarding payments made by a couple to two 
different Indian surrogates. In that case, the then President of the Family Division, Sir Nicholas Wall, 
found that that whilst the payments did not comply with S54 HFEA 2008, they were not 
disproportionate and the couple had acted in good faith: POs were granted. 
Thus, it already appears that what might be considered payments beyond ‘reasonable expenses’ or 
compensation (as certainly happens in most overseas arrangements) will generally always be 
authorised by a court unless another reason exists for the court to refuse to grant an order. If this 
wasn’t enough on its own to call into question the adequacy of the current law, 2015 gave us further 
instances that show exactly how frayed at the seams it has become, and illustrate the problems 
caused by the failure to adequately review the law and the assumptions upon which it rests when 
the opportunity arose prior to the HFE Act 2008. For ease, the cases selected can be summarised 
into categories: disputes about intention, applications by single applicants and extensions of the 
statutory time limit. 
A. Disputes about Intention – H v S (Surrogacy Agreement) 
In H v S (Surrogacy Arrangement), 21 a case that was media-hyped, including front-page coverage in a 
national newspaper, the IPs were awarded the care of a 15-month old despite the wishes of the legal 
mother. The case revolved around a disputed arrangement – not about whether a surrogate would 
give up the child or not, or about payment of expenses or otherwise, but about whether or not a 
surrogacy arrangement had even been entered into. The parties were a male same-sex couple (H and 
B, H being the biological father of the child) and the legal mother (S) in relation to the child, M. H 
and B contended that they had entered into an agreement with S that she would carry a child for 
them as a surrogate, that H and B would be the child’s co-parents, but that S would ‘continue to play 
a role in the child’s life’.22 S claimed that the agreement was that she would be the child’s main 
parent and carer, that ‘H would be, in effect, a sperm donor’ and that she and H would be ‘like two 
heterosexual parents that have a child and are separated’.23 Any role that B might play in M’s life 
was ‘vociferously rejected’ by S. 
The case did not arise from a PO application but dealt with applications made by H and B for 
parental responsibility and a child arrangements order providing that the child would live with them 
under the Children Act 1989/Children and Families Act 2014 and a counter-application by S for a 
child arrangements order providing that the child would live with her. At the time of the hearing, the 
child lived with S, who had obstructed H and B having regular contact with her and breached interim 
court orders. M’s guardian told the court that S’s negative opinions of H and B would cause the child 
emotional harm and confusion about her identity. She recommended that M reside with H and B 
and that contact with S be reduced to once a month. Ms Justice Russell DBE found that ‘the 
                                                          
19 [2010] EWHC 3146 (Fam). 
20 [2011] EWHC 3147 (Fam). 
21 [2015] EWFC 36. 
22 At [1]. 
23 Ibid. 
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legislation that governs altruistic surrogacy had no part in the decisions as S does not consent to a 
parental order or to having acted as a gestational surrogate’.24 The legal issue was therefore 
essentially about the child’s living arrangements; ultimately a child welfare decision. Despite finding 
that this was not a surrogacy case,25 Russell J observed that Re N (A Child)26 (a disputed surrogacy 
case which was resolved with the child being allowed to stay with the IPs, as a matter of best 
interests) had similar facts. There, the Court of Appeal endorsed an approach that centred on the 
child's welfare, asking ‘…Put very simply, in which home is he most likely to mature into a happy and 
balanced adult and to achieve his fullest potential as a human?’27 
Concluding her decision in H v S, Russell J said the court’s function was not ‘to decide on the nature 
of the agreement between H, B and S and then either enforce it or put it in place’ but to ‘decide 
what best serves the interests and welfare of this child throughout her childhood’.28 It was clear to 
the court that S could not prioritise the child’s needs above her own and would be unable to meet 
M’s emotional needs ‘now and in the long term’.29 Conceding that moving a young child from the 
person she viewed as her mother was a difficult decision likely to cause distress, Russell J found H 
would best be able to meet the child's immediate and future needs. He had shown the ability to 
allow her to grow into a happy, balanced and healthy adult and he could help her to reach her 
greatest potential.30 Arguably, however, the best decision in welfare terms would have been the 
greater legal and practical stability that would be provided for S by a PO, rather than mere 
determination of residence and parental responsibility, thus a finding that this – despite or because 
of the deception – was a surrogacy arrangement could ultimately have benefited S. Ironically, in 
almost the next sentences of her judgment, Russell J implicitly concedes the arrangement was in fact 
surrogacy: 
The pregnancy was contrived with the aim of a same-sex couple having a child to form a 
family assisted by a friend, this was ostensibly acquiesced to by all parties at the time the 
agreement was entered into and conception took place. Therefore M living with H and B and 
spending time with S from time to time fortunately coincides with the reality of her conception 
and accords with M's identity and place within her family.31 
Therefore, despite the attention this case received, it merely highlights that all decisions in 
surrogacy or supposedly ‘not-surrogacy’ arrangements must ultimately be based on the child’s best 
                                                          
24 At [3]. Note a potential terminological problem arises as usually the phrase ‘gestational surrogate’ (also ‘host 
surrogate’) is used to refer to a woman who has the embryo or gametes of the intended parents (and/or 
donors) transferred into her for gestation. A woman who uses her own egg in a surrogacy arrangement is 
commonly referred to as a ‘straight’ or ‘traditional’ surrogate. 
25 Though, confusingly, one of the findings of the court was that the mother had ‘...deliberately misled the 
Applicants in order to conceive a child for herself rather than changing her mind at a later date’ ([55]), 
suggesting that if the court was so minded it could have chosen to treat this as a surrogacy arrangement. Had 
this been the case, the issue remaining would be S’s (lack of) consent to a parental order. The mere fact that 
she did not consent to a parental order, as it was put, does not of itself make this not a surrogacy 
arrangement. 
26 [2007] EWCA Civ 1053. 
27 At [12]-[13]. 
28 At [125]. 
29 At [120]. 
30 At [122]. 
31 At [125] (emphasis added). 
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interests. An interesting comment at the beginning of the judgment indicates the court’s view on 
agreements reached ‘privately’ between potential parents: 
The lack of a properly supported and regulated framework for arrangements of this kind has, 
inevitably, lead to an increase in these cases before the Family Court.32 
This is true in relation to all forms of assisted reproduction – private and especially do-it-yourself 
arrangements can be dangerous for everyone concerned, and are less likely to best promote the 
welfare of the children born through them.33 With surrogacy, properly regulated and legislatively-
supported agencies and advisers, coupled with a legal framework that does not perpetuate the myth 
that something is fundamentally ‘wrong’ about surrogacy by resting on the assumption that 
surrogacy involves babies being taken away from their mothers, would better serve the interests of 
children, by coinciding with the reality of their conception and understandings of their identity and 
place within their family. This would also better support and facilitate expectations of both 
surrogates and IPs, as information gleaned for a recent survey on the practice of surrogacy in the UK 
shows.34 Given that we know the long term psychological and social health of families created via 
surrogacy is good,35 and that surrogates and their own families fare well after well-conducted 
arrangements,36 it is time that the policy underpinning the entirety of the law on surrogacy – 
especially that related to parenthood – is properly reviewed. 
 
B. Single Applicants - Re B v C (Surrogacy: Adoption) and Re Z (A Child: Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Act: Parental Order) 
Two 2015 cases illustrate the problems that single people who use surrogacy encounter when 
seeking to become legal parents. Early in the year more media hype was dedicated to an 
arrangement entered by a single man whose own mother was the surrogate (using a donated egg).37 
The crux of the case – the first reported relating to a single person seeking parenthood via surrogacy 
– was the application by the intended father, Mr Casson, to adopt his own child (he was ineligible, as 
a single person, for a PO). Adoption was the only option for him to become the legal father of a child 
who was biologically his, and which but for him would not have come into existence. This too was 
difficult, due to the fact that the arrangement had been made before the child was in existence, as 
                                                          
32 At [2]. 
33 In relation to donor conception and the legal and other risks of ‘DIY’ arrangements, see E Jackson, ‘The Law 
and DIY Assisted Conception’ in K Horsey (ed) Revisiting the Regulation of Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
(Routledge, Abingdon, 2015) 31. See also Re N (A Child) [2007] EWCA Civ 1053. 
34 K Horsey, ‘‘Surrogacy in the UK: Myth busting and reform’ Report of the Surrogacy UK 
Working Group on Surrogacy Law Reform’ (Surrogacy UK, November 2015), section 3.1 and also graphs in 
Appendix 2 at pp 45-48. 
35 S Golombok, L Blake, P Casey, G Roman and V Jadva, (2013) ‘Children born through reproductive donation: A 
longitudinal study of child adjustment’ 54 Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry 653. 
36 V Jadva, S Imrie and S Golombok, (2015) ‘Surrogate mothers 10 years on: A longitudinal study of 
psychological wellbeing and relationships with the parents and child’ 30(2) Human Reproduction 373-379. 
37 B v C (Surrogacy: Adoption) [2015] EWFC 17. See e.g. ‘I don't care what people think. My baby's loved, I'm 
happy and nothing else matters: Single gay man and his mum who gave birth to his surrogate son insist they've 
done nothing wrong’ Daily Mail (15 March 2015). 
Kirsty Horsey      For publication in Medical Law Review 
 
well as the fact that Mr Casson was legally the child’s brother,38 but the adoption order was 
eventually granted. The facts combined (supposedly) made it imperative for the court to look 
intricately at the arrangement and at the relevant (adoption) law, in order to determine – perversely 
– that Mr Casson had not committed a criminal offence. Had this been able to proceed like every 
other surrogacy arrangement, the stress and disruption to the child and the family could have been 
minimised.39 
Re Z, decided in September 2015, raises further issues regarding single applicants.40 Here, a PO 
application was made by a single man (again the biological father). Sir James Munby, President of 
the Family Division, found himself unable to grant the order, despite clear and unequivocal consent 
from the American surrogate and support from the Cafcass Parental Order Reporter. The decision 
turned on the literal wording of S54(4) HFE Act 2008. As Munby P described it, 
But for one matter this application would be unproblematic. The problem is that the 
application is made by a single parent, whereas section 54 seemingly requires an application 
to be made by “two people”.41 
Z asked the court to interpret the law flexibly, as if it said 'one or' two applicants. His lawyers 
contended that modern international surrogacy makes single fathers conceiving biological children 
on their own a reality.42 They argued that the law should not deny such children legal recognition, 
and that the discrimination against single parents makes no sense (and may be contrary to the right 
to private and family life under the Human Rights Act 1998) given the fact that single men and 
women in the UK may become legal parents through adoption, IVF or donor conception.43  However, 
                                                          
38 S33(1) HFE Act 2008 renders the woman who gives birth, ‘and no other woman’ the legal mother. As this 
was his own mother, the child becomes, in law, his brother.  
39 The arrangement only became treated – in law – as a ‘not-surrogacy’ arrangement once the inadequacy of 
the parental order provisions under S54 HFE Act 2008 was shown. Though this would also have happened if his 
mother had not been the surrogate, the adoption process would have been somewhat easier as the child 
would not have been his ‘brother’. The case therefore also illustrates a further problem (not as uncommon 
where mothers or sisters act as surrogates for a female relative) with regarding the surrogate as the legal 
mother of the child at birth, a presumption upon which the whole law rests but which has never been 
questioned. Crucially, surrogates do not view themselves as the mother of the children they carry, as 
evidenced in the recent survey referred to in note 34, above, and believe that the law is wrong to recognise 
them as such.  
40 [2015] EWFC 73. 
41 At [5]. 
42 In fact, though such a situation is more likely to be experienced by a single man, it is not impossible that a 
woman could be a single applicant. In terms of law reform, presumably this would cause concern that allowing 
such a thing might encourage ‘vanity’ or ‘convenience’ surrogacy. However, there are situations where 
surrogacy for a single woman might have medical reasons – for example a young woman undergoing 
treatment for cancer and who stores her eggs or ovarian tissue to retain the chance of having her own children 
at a later date. Relatedly to the treatment or otherwise, she later needs a hysterectomy (perhaps even after 
having a first child – IVF and related procedures do not exclude single women, though the clinic would be 
obliged to consider the welfare of the potential future child. In practice, being single is no real barrier to IVF or 
other clinical fertility treatment (see e.g. E Lee, J Macvarish and S Sheldon ‘Assessing Child Welfare under the 
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008: A Case Study in Medicalization?’ (2014) 36 Sociology of Health 
& Illness 500), so it is difficult to see why the same woman – particularly one in that situation – should not be 
able to achieve motherhood via surrogacy). 
43 See Natalie Gamble Associates, ‘High Court rules it cannot grant birth certificates to single dads through 
surrogacy’ at http://www.nataliegambleassociates.co.uk/blog/2015/09/07/high-court-rules-it-cannot-grant-
birth-certificates-to-single-dads-through-surrogacy/. 
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on this occasion Munby P considered the court unable to ‘read down’ the law, and found that the 
Human Rights Act could not be used to amend the law without Parliament's involvement. Crucially, 
the potential to allow single people to apply for POs had been considered and rejected in debates 
leading to the 2008 Act.44 A sensible amendment to S54 had been suggested, partly as a response to 
the introduction of the ‘supportive parenting’ concept in the 2008 Act, though also with a view to 
making the law on surrogacy consistent with adoption. In dismissing the amendment, Dawn 
Primarolo MP (as she was then), said: 
…surrogacy is such a sensitive issue, fraught with potential complications such as the 
surrogate mother being entitled to change her mind and decide to keep her baby, that the 
1990 Act quite specifically limits parental orders to married couples where the gametes of at 
least one of them are used. That recognises the magnitude of a situation in which a person 
becomes pregnant with the express intention of handing the child over to someone else, and 
the responsibility that that places on the people who will receive the child. There is an 
argument, which the Government have acknowledged in the Bill, that such a responsibility is 
likely to be better handled by a couple than a single man or woman.45 
Though it is possible to see how Munby J felt his hands were tied, the sheer lack of interrogation that 
these comments have been subjected to is incredible. It is surely a magnitudinous decision when 
people who are not the parents of a child to decide to adopt. Yet the government apparently trusts 
single people in this situation, but not following surrogacy. In any event, these statements rest on 
presumptions of magnitude that the surrogacy community itself is saying is unfounded, and draws 
on the ‘potential complications’ of the surrogate changing her mind that are in fact exceedingly rare 
occurrences (notwithstanding the deception cases discussed above). 
The putative father in Z has latterly sought a declaration that the legislation (specifically S54(4)) is 
incompatible with human rights laws. A decision is awaited later this year. If Z succeeds in his claim it 
would seem that at least part of S54 will have to be rewritten. This (alongside the other flaws in the 
legislation shown by other cases considered here) would grant the perfect opportunity to review the 
law as a whole, perhaps with a view to the creation of an entirely new, comprehensive piece of 
surrogacy legislation – freshly and properly considered and based on modern understandings of 
family and empirical data – that is fitting for and reflective of modern day surrogacy. 
 
C. Extensions to the Six-month Statutory Time Limit - A & B (Children) (Surrogacy: Parental Orders: 
Time Limits) 
S54(3) HFE Act 2008 states that for a PO to be granted, the relevant application must be made within 
six months after the birth of the child to which the application pertains.46 Despite this, in X (A Child) 
(Surrogacy: Time Limit),47 Munby P had granted an order after the six-month deadline had passed, 
finding a purposive interpretation of S54(3) acceptable. He referred to the time limit as ‘almost 
                                                          
44 See paras [15]-[17] and [36]. 
45 Public Bill Committee debate, Hansard, cols 248-9 (House of Commons, 12 June 2008). 
46 Though if made within the first six weeks, S54(7) renders ineffective any consent given by the surrogate to 
the making of the order. 
47 [2014] EWHC 3135 (Fam). 
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nonsensical’ and asked: ‘Can Parliament really have intended that the gate should be barred forever 
if the application for a parental order is lodged even one day late? I cannot think so’.48 He added:  
Given the subject matter, given the consequences for the commissioning parents, never mind 
those for the child, to construe section 54(3) as barring forever an application made just one 
day late is not, in my judgment, sensible.49 
Munby’s decision in X was later followed and endorsed in A & B (Children) (Surrogacy: Parental 
orders: time limits),50 where the High Court granted POs for children aged 8 and 5, who until that 
point had in fact been legally parentless. After their births via a Californian surrogate, pre-birth US 
court orders had enabled the British parents to have birth certificates issued in their names, but 
under UK law, without a PO, the couple were legally strangers to their own children. They did not 
discover this fact until 2012.51 Granting the orders despite the significantly longer time beyond six 
months than in X, Russell J said it would be ‘manifestly unjust to give a delay that was innocently 
wrought, even a very long one such as this, greater weight than the welfare of these children’.52 She 
placed great emphasis, rightly, on the children’s knowledge of the means of their conception and 
birth, as part of their identity, and the inappropriateness of adoption orders for parents who had 
children through surrogacy.53 Further, she was guided by the principle that the welfare principle 
must outweigh any public policy concerns,54 other than in the clearest cases of abuse of public 
policy, which this was not.55 
Later in 2015 saw A & B (No 2 - Parental Order),56 a complicated case in which a couple applied for a 
PO for twins born to a surrogate in India in December 2011.57 Their application was late because 
they had been unaware that an order was required, and why.58 Their names were on the Indian birth 
certificates. When they first became aware of the necessity (or desirability) of a PO, they were 
advised that they were ineligible. As with the previous case, the decision in X had alerted them to 
the possibility of obtaining the orders. All of their actions had been in good faith. Mrs Justice Theis 
DBE was invited to consider whether the order could be granted despite the application being made 
out of time, alongside the issue of the children’s home being with both of the applicants, who had by 
that time separated,59 and more well-rehearsed domicile,60 consent61 and payment issues.62 She 
                                                          
48 At [55]. 
49 Ibid. 
50 [2015] EWHC 911 (Fam). 
51 This meant inter alia that the parents had no legal rights to make decisions on behalf of the children, the 
children were not British, and had no inheritance rights or rights to financial protection if the couple 
separated. 
52 At [71]. 
53 At [61]-[67] and [71]. 
54 See Re L [2010] EWHC 3030 (Fam), at [10], per Hedley J. 
55 At [46]-[47]. 
56 [2015] EWHC 2080 (Fam). See also AB v CD (Surrogacy - Time Limit and Consent) [2015] EWFC 12 (Fam) and 
A and B (Children: Surrogacy: Parental Orders: Time limit) [2015] EWHC 911 (Fam). 
57 At the time of the hearing, the children were three years old. 
58 See para [65]. 
59 S54(4)(a) requires that at the time of the making of the application ‘the child’s home must be with the 
applicants’. 
60 S54(4)(b) requires that at the time of the making of the application ‘either or both of the applicants must be 
domiciled in the United Kingdom or in the Channel Islands or the Isle of Man’. Both parties had been born 
abroad but asserted that they were domiciled in the UK. 
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began her judgment by stating that the case raised ‘important issues as to the extent the court is 
able to purposively interpret or ‘read down’ the criteria’ in S54 HFE Act 2008, following the decision 
in X’.63 She went on to explain some of the problems that lack of a PO can cause: 
Without a parental order the commissioning parents will not be the legal parents of the child 
they have probably cared for since birth, and whom the child regards as their de facto parents. 
Whilst this in itself may not affect their ability to provide day to day care for the child, it may 
have long term consequences, for example affecting inheritance rights…64  
After careful analysis, Theis J felt able to purposively interpret S54(3), and ‘read it down’ so as to give 
effect to the children’s long-term welfare interests (and all parties’ human rights, in particular those 
stemming from Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights). In her opinion, ‘to not 
construe it in such a way could have detrimental long term consequences for the children and the 
applicants, which is precisely what the section sets out to prevent’.65 
 
CONCLUSION 
If questions remain about the inadequacies of our laws, another 2015 case, decided towards the 
very end of the year, illustrates the problems clearly. In Re Z (Foreign surrogacy: allocation of work) 
[2015],66 Russell J gave guidance for the handling of international surrogacy cases, after twins born 
to a surrogate were unable to leave India for over a year. The IPs had already had one child by 
surrogacy in India. The return of the twins was delayed by the British Passport Office’s refusal to 
accept as authentic documents the parents provided confirming the identity of the surrogate and 
the fact she was widowed (so there was no second legal parent). There was also a problem in the UK 
courts, in that the case was wrongly allocated to a local rather than a High Court judge, causing 
further delay. As Russell J put it: 
The situation for them and for the commissioning parents was increasing parlous as time 
passed placing a significant and increasing financial and emotional burden on the family as 
well as denying the children the opportunity to develop the important initial bond that babies 
need.67 
Clearly to be in such a situation – looked after by nannies in poor accommodation – would not be in 
the children’s best interests – considering the disruption this would have caused, the insecurity 
about their future and the lack of quality time that the children were able to spend with their IPs 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
61 S54(6) requires that the court is satisfied that the surrogate (and her spouse or partner, if they are also the 
legal parent) has ‘freely, and with full understanding of what is involved, agreed unconditionally to the making 
of the order’. 
62 See section above – it appears that payment alone, commercial or otherwise, will not be enough to negate 
an application for a parental order where to grant one would otherwise be in the best interests of the 
child(ren) concerned. 
63 At [4]. 
64 At [12]. 
65 At [72]. It is hard to see how this statement would not also be potentially very helpful to the claims made by 
single man claim in Re Z. 
66 [2015] EWFC 90. 
67 At [6]. 
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(and their sister) for the entirety of the first year of their lives. The situation may have long-term 
effects on the entire family, not least the children. 
Again, the failure of our surrogacy laws to recognise the IPs as the real parents of these children (and 
in this particular case, the rights this would have given in terms of nationality) is highlighted. Russell J 
has now issued guidance meaning that in future, all surrogacy cases where the birth takes place 
outside of England or Wales will be handled by a High Court judge with experience in international 
surrogacy cases (or in conjunction with one who has).68 She also criticised the role the Passport 
Office played in the delays in this case. However, though there were additional administrative 
failures which increased the hardship faced by this family, it remains a clear illustration of how our 
laws need to be updated and reformed in the best interests of children. 
Each decision discussed above highlights just how inadequate UK surrogacy law has become in 
relation to the realities of 21st century surrogacy. We cannot escape the fact that the internet and 
other developments have changed the landscape of surrogacy – not just in ease of accessing 
information but also in the many different sources of information, of differing standards and created 
for different purposes, including ‘packages’ offered to surrogacy destinations where the process and 
legalities, such as who will be named on the birth certificate, are made to appear easier (and 
therefore more tempting to potential parents). Accurate information about surrogacy does exist, but 
people searching would need to know where to look in order to find it. 
Coupled with technological developments and an increased marketisation of surrogacy overseas are 
societal changes that have led to increased acceptance of different family forms and different ways 
of going about forming families. Surrogacy does not have the same ‘yuk factor’ it once may have had 
and, in fact, can be seen as one of the ultimate acts of kindness, even where the surrogate is 
compensated for her out of pocket expenses. Commercial practices – as the majority of internet-
sourced arrangements and overseas arrangements are – complicate this understanding. This is 
particularly true because our law is predicated on the assumption that surrogacy ought to be purely 
altruistic in nature. The entire tenor of the law and its focus on non-commercialisation, alongside the 
parenthood provisions following surrogacy that rest on long-held but unchallenged presumptions 
models surrogacy not as a form of assisted reproduction, but a form of adoption. This 
(re)emphasises the wrongly-held assumption that surrogacy means mothers giving up their babies, 
leading inevitably to concerns about vulnerable women and potential exploitation. 
What the law singularly fails to reflect is lived experience: the view of surrogates that they are not 
mothers, the fact that IPs (who may have already expended a great deal of time, energy and money 
on unsuccessful IVF treatments and/or suffered from repeated miscarriages) are vulnerable too, 
frightened about the ‘risk’ – foregrounded by the law – that the surrogate will change her mind. 
They are also worried about achieving legal parenthood. It is no wonder that some turn to overseas 
surrogacy, particularly when marketed as the ‘safer’ more certain option. Our legal provisions and an 
accessible overseas surrogacy marketplace, lead to a lack of understanding of the legal intricacies 
involved in surrogacy among many prospective parents, which unfortunately drives some abroad.69 
Those who come to surrogacy via failed attempts at IVF or other treatments may have the benefit of 
                                                          
68 Para [73]. 
69 See feature article cited in n1, above. See also Re Z (Foreign surrogacy: allocation of work) (2015), a case 
starkly illustrating some of the unexpected pitfalls of overseas surrogacy arrangements. 
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advice from clinics or support agencies that is able to counter this problem – letting them know that 
it is possible to do surrogacy, and do it well, in the UK – and outlining the legalities involved in 
overseas arrangements. However, one risk is that they have by this time exhausted themselves 
financially, try to go it alone and therefore do not receive the best advice, leaving them potentially 
vulnerable to fraudsters and more heartbreak. Furthermore, there is an increasing market for 
surrogacy among the gay community and specialist marketeers already in place with pathways to 
‘good’ surrogacy outcomes for this (commercial) expanding client base. 
Arguably, the framework of the existing law creates and perpetuates a particular understanding of 
surrogacy and drives the continuing (external) market for it. It is common knowledge among those 
involved with surrogacy on both a professional and volunteer basis that prospective parents have 
often misunderstood what they ‘get’ from overseas arrangements, in terms of legal rights and 
parenthood. Overseas birth certificates naming both IPs as co-parents of the child(ren) born via 
surrogacy have no effect at home, due to S33(1) HFE Act – a parental order is still required, and 
there may still be immigration issues. 
Overall, many of the problems being highlighted in recent surrogacy cases could be avoided if there 
was sensible law reform. If IPs were recognised as legal parents of children born to a surrogate from 
the outset, fewer people would travel overseas for surrogacy. Parenthood is what these people 
desperately desire. For those who did travel, for whatever reason (perhaps cultural connections), 
immigration problems would be more easily resolved. POs would be rendered unnecessary (this 
would also better align surrogacy with other assisted reproductive practices and disassociate it from 
adoption) or, if retained, could be made to become effective at birth, as happens in some other 
jurisdictions. If this were to be the case, removing the requirements of coupledom and genetic 
linkage would make surrogacy consistent with other assisted reproductive practices (and with 
adoption).70  
                                                          
70 Unconsidered in this note is a further provision of S54 which requires at least one of the applying couple to 
have a genetic link to the child(ren) in order to become eligible for a parental order. The rationale for this 
requirement is presumably to ‘legitimise’ the relationship and in some way to prevent and protect women and 
their spouses/partners being pressured into (or deliberately and criminally embarking on) conceiving babies 
purely with the aim of giving them away (harking back to previous links of surrogacy to so-called ‘baby-
selling’). It is hard to imagine that without evidence of such pressure being exerted or of the inability to stem 
such criminal behaviour, this requirement remains justified, particularly in a circumstance where an infertile 
couple is unfortunate enough to require ‘double donation’. In South Africa, a corresponding provision was 
recently ruled unconstitutional on the grounds that it ‘violates … rights to equality, dignity, reproductive health 
care, autonomy and privacy’ (AB and Another v Minister of Social Development As Amicus Curiae: Centre for 
Child Law (40658/13) [2015] ZAGPPHC 580 (12 August 2015) (at [76]). On the argument that the child’s welfare 
was best served by maintaining the genetic link requirement, the judge in that case said this was ‘an insult to 
all those families that do not have a parent-child genetic link’ (at [84])). Removing this requirement in the UK 
would better mirror other forms of assisted reproduction, such as IVF donated egg and sperm – where this is 
not required in law. In IVF, genetically related or not, the woman giving birth would become the legal mother. 
It is conceivable therefore that this might one day result in a discrimination claim on the difference of 
treatment of same-sex female couples from same-sex male couples (who could only achieve parenthood via 
surrogacy) in law. 
